How Political Scientists Can Test Internet Voting Security

A public policy debate is brewing in the United States concerning whether or not our election technology should include Internet voting. While there are many dimensions to this debate, generally people are asking “if I can bank online and shop online, why can’t I vote online?”

Also, the inconvenience of our 19^th Century practice of trekking to polling places to cast a vote is being questioned across the nation. After news reports about long waits in line at poling places during the 2012 election, President Obama said “we’ve got to fix that.”

To study the problem, in March, 2013, President Obama issued an Executive Order convening his Presidential Commission on ElectionAdministration.  The Commission was chaired by two Washington lawyers – Robert F. Bauer, a Democrat, and Benjamin L. Ginsberg, a Republican.

I submitted my research paper on Internet voting, and other comments, to the Commission in favor of encouraging states and local jurisdictions to implement online voting trials, especially for overseas military.

The Commission released its Report on election administration in January, 2014. The Report made some recommendations for trying to make polling place voting more efficient and convenient. It also praised the move by several states to implement online voter registration. More than 25 states now have online voter registration.  While recognizing the convenience and efficiency of registering to vote via the Internet, the Commission stated, without evidence or further comment, that “the internet is not yet secure enough for voting” (p 60).

What I find so interesting, even amazing, is that not only does a Presidential Commission on Election Administration simply assume, with no scientific evidence, that the Internet is too insecure for voting, but so do nearly all the key participants in this important public policy problem.  I also find it amazing, and regrettable, that the political science profession in the US is so quiet on the issue of Internet voting security.  Other than my paper, now being presented to the American Political Science Association, I know of no other studies testing the hypothesis of Internet voting insecurity.

Hypothesis Testing

The well known philosopher of science, Karl Popper, has argued that an essential function of any science is that of conjecture and refutation.  Since voting and elections are central to the domain of the political science profession, shouldn’t political scientists be engaged in the effort at least to test, if not refute, the hypothesis of Internet voting insecurity?

It appears to me that out of an excess of deference for computer scientists, political scientists are not using their expertise and methods to make any sort of contribution to this very consequential public policy debate.

Therefore, one of the primary aims of my paper is to show political scientists how they can test the widely accepted, but untested, hypothesis that the Internet is too insecure for voting.  I want political scientists to see that they can use their own methods of study – especially case studies – to test the hypothesis of Internet voting insecurity, and do so independently of whatever claims activist computer scientists assert.

I take two well known approaches to testing the hypothesis of Internet voting insecurity. First, I look carefully at the language used by its proponents to assert and to support it. Second, I examine the actual experience of Internet voting trials, as case studies, to see if these facts support or undermine the validity of the hypothesis.

Assertions that Internet voting cannot be done securely are presented in the form of factual statements.  Karl Popper has set the standard for assessing the scientific quality of statements about matters of fact. Statements that purport to be factual, but that cannot be disproven under any circumstances cannot be considered scientific statements, says Popper, but must be consider folk tales or myths. In other words, to be scientific a statement of fact must be falsifiable, that is, capable of disproof. If it can’t be tested, then it can’t be factual.

One example of an unfalsifiable argument is the ancient admonition, “The End is Nigh.”  This supposedly factual claim has never been disproven. Indeed, one discussion of false Armageddon predictions has it that the first warning on record is found on an Assyrian clay tablet from 2800 BC.

Because this fear mongering Armageddon claim is impervious to both logical criticism and empirical disproof, it creates the illusion of Indubitable Truth for its adherents.  By logic, just because the End has not yet occurred, does not mean it will not occur – and soon. Empirically, it is unfalsifiable because with each failure today the prediction can simply be moved to tomorrow.

In the paper, I discuss numerous unfalsifiable claims made by an avant-garde of activist computer scientists in support of their hypothesis of Internet voting insecurity.  I think it important to note that none of the computer scientists in this avant-garde have any experience building Internet voting systems that were actually used in elections for public office. I should also point out that the computer scientists who have set up such systems are confident that security threats can be adequately protected against.

Self-Erasing Bugs

One of the many unfalsifiable claims made against Internet voting is that malicious code can be installed in a computer that tallies votes, and can change the results of an election, and can then erase itself and never be detected.

If this is true, then the integrity of no election that relies on a computer to count the vote can be trusted. Every such election result could be the product of undetected, self-erasing malicious code.

I argue in the paper that very scary stories, such as this, are part of a strategy activist computer scientists have followed to put themselves in charge of election administration in the United States. I argue further that they have succeeded!

In my view, activist computer scientists have executed a coup d'état over the election administration function of government in this country.  Among other things, they have had laws passed in several states requiring what they call a “Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail” for every vote cast.  Having a paper record, they say, is the only way to be sure upon audit that the vote tally matches the votes actually cast, and that the count is not the product of undetected, self-erasing malicious code.

This coup d'état includes the conquest of territory that political scientists have traditionally thought to be a core element of their professional field of study. Since this conquest, it seems that political scientists can say nothing about implementing technological reforms in election administration for fear of attracting the public disapproval of activist computer scientists. Indeed, I show how this actually happened in 2004, when political scientists Thad Hall and Michael Alvarez, who favored Internet voting, were completely overruled by just a few very vocal doom predicting anti-Internet voting computer scientists – who also had a lot of help from the New York Times.

In their defense, political scientists can use the Popperian standard that says unfalsifiable claims are mythical and not scientific.  The charge that an election could have been the result of undetected, self-erasing malicious code does seem to be an unfalsifiable claim, and therefore not scientific.  But this argument, by itself, is not likely to assure a frightened public or the legislators who must answer to that public.

In my view, the only effective way to nullify, or falsify, this scary claim is through the use of case studies of actual Internet voting trials.

Case Studies as Tests

If political scientists produced study after study of elections involving online voting in which there were no doubts about the integrity of the results, then the conclusion may be fairly drawn that the integrity of the results can reasonably be trusted.

Case studies can describe the security measures taken in a given election. Then the study can state the results of interviews of key people, and of polling. Key people would include relevant elections experts, elections officials and administrators, the computer scientists involved, journalists, winning and losing candidates, party leaders and political activists, as well as voters. Opinions may vary, and the reasons for those opinions can be included. If the research shows that in the minds of these folks there is confidence in the legitimacy of the vote, then claims of doubt could be seen as just more baseless cries of “wolf.”

If activist computer scientists continue to dogmatically insist that “you can never know for certain whether a disappearing bug changed the outcome,” they can reasonably be dismissed as myth-makers and fear mongers.  Indeed, I have done some preliminary case studies of Internet voting trials for elections to public office.  These include West Virginia in 2010, and Norway in 2011 and 2013.  Here, only the same few activist computer scientists insisted on such notions as there could have been a disappearing bug at work, but the officials, experts, candidates, and public felt confidence in the results.

In Canada, about 50 different cities have conducted Internet voting trials, all without doubts about the legitimacy of the results --  except for anti-Internet voting activists. Case studies of these elections are being done by Canadian political scientist, Nicole Goodman.

My paper also closely examines a report issued by the Elections Division at NIST. Unfortunately, that report merely repeats all the unfalsifiable claims of the activist computer scientists, without any social scientific case studies, or any other kind of science.

Conclusion

In conclusion, political science has the methodology it needs to undo the coup in US election administration and its own ouster from the public policy debate over election technology reform. Our profession only needs to apply these methods and to assert itself.

******************************

William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Political Scientist, author, speaker,
CEO for The Internet Voting Research and Education Fund

Email: Internetvoting@gmail.com 

Blog: http://tinyurl.com/IV4All 

Twitter: wjkno1

LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/pub/william-j-kelleher-ph-d/9/466/687/

Author of Internet Voting Now! 

Kindle edition: http://tinyurl.com/IntV-Now

In paper: http://tinyurl.com/IVNow2011