Internet voting is coming to the USA! How do I know that?
Successful trials were conducted in the US in 2000, 2004, and 2008. Congress encouraged online voting in the 2009 MOVE ACT (Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act). In the November 2010 elections, 33 states gave some form of Internet voting a try so that their overseas voters, especially those in the military, could vote conveniently. There have been no reports of either technical or security problems. Indeed, West Virginia’s secretary of state, Natalie Tennant, tried a small experiment with Internet voting on the state’s secure website, and promptly requested that the state legislature allocate funds to expand the practice. Trials of Internet voting within states are likely to begin soon. Local elections officials understand that voting via the Net is much cheaper to administer than polling place voting. Of course, no voting technology is greener than paperless Internet voting.
The only failed Internet voting trial in the US was in Washington D.C. in October of 2010. No actual vote was held, but when the public was invited to test the system it was hacked. That experience just proved how miserably inept were the amateur programmers
who set up the system. Over the last 10 years, several nations in Europe, and provinces in Canada, have been testing Internet voting systems with success. The Russian Duma recently approved plans to try Internet voting for voters in remote locations, such as Siberia.
Convenience for voters, and savings in the costs of election administration, are too tempting to resist. The companies that have successfully built Internet voting systems have been in every state capital pitching their products to legislators and elections officials. This change is inevitable.
Now is the time for progressives to plan, not on how to resist the change, but on how to turn it to our advantage. If we do nothing, or if we protest and fail, Internet voting will emerge as the way Americans vote, and our political system will be no better for it. But if we look ahead, and plan well, we can turn Internet voting into a progressive reform of historic proportions.
Do you think that Big Money has UNFAIR INFLUENCE in US elections and in our legislative process? Internet voting, rightly organized, can neutralize all their power.
Search this site for detailed answers. See, for example,
Public Enemy Number One
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Monday, January 17, 2011
Saturday, December 18, 2010
Query Letter for Agents and Publishers
Query Letter RE: Book Proposal Entitled
INTERNET VOTING NOW! HERE'S WHY. HERE'S HOW.
Dear {Specific Name}
SECURITY! Of course, this is what most folks worry about first when the subject of Internet voting comes up. The convenience offered by Internet voting in all US elections is easy to see – voting from home, work, etc., with no more treks to the polling place, where parking may be difficult to find and one may have to wait in line, perhaps in inclement weather. But because the fear factor looms large in many minds, security must be the first topic addressed in a book that advocates taking such a revolutionary leap forward. Chapter One thoroughly discusses the security issue, as well as the short history of Internet voting in the United States. (There were three small initial trials in the presidential election of 2000, and, among other things, a large project in 2004.)
I also show in the first chapter that Internet voting security technology is as sophisticated and reliable as the security technology used daily by the US military, international e-commerce and finance, as well as online banking and shopping.
My book’s main point is that Internet voting can be used to make US presidential elections both far more convenient and democratic than they are currently. I beef up the argument in favor of such a radical reform with a discussion of “The Original Intentions of Our Founding Fathers for Presidential Elections,” which is the title of Chapter Two. Drawing from sources that include The Federalist Papers, Madison’s Notes on the Philadelphia Convention, Washington’s Farewell Address, and quotes from the US Constitution, I show that the authors of the Constitution originally hoped that its procedure for presidential elections would deter political parties from coming to dominate the process. Well, that didn’t work, and I offer some reasons why. I also show that they intended their procedure, centered on the Electoral College, to be as orderly and conducive to reason and deliberation as was their convention in Philadelphia.
To invite criticisms from colleagues, I posted Chapter Two as an essay on SSRN, a website used by professors of law, political science, and other social sciences. So far, the paper has had over 2700 online reads, and almost 250 downloads. People have learned about it by word of mouth. I have received numerous comments via email, many of which have praised the work and offered helpful critiques. While I have posted all the chapter drafts there as essays, the polished products are available on request. (The drafts are at http://ssrn.com/author=1053589 Click on the chapter title to go to the page where the statistics are displayed. The essays on Polanyi listed there are not part of the book).
In Chapter Three I contrast our country’s current presidential election practices with the original intentions of the Constitution’s Framers as discussed in Chapter Two. It’s a poor match, indeed. Among other things, they anticipated a cost free process, and we have a money-dependent process because the costs of campaigning are so high. For example, candidate Obama raised and spent over $740,000,000 in his 2008 campaign. They hoped for a nonpartisan process, and ours is thoroughly partisan. But this need not be.
Chapter Four shows how Internet voting, rightly organized, can fully satisfy the hopes of the Framers for a deliberative process that would cost the candidates nothing. Let Citizens United be the rule, when organized along the lines I set forth, big spending will have little or no effect on the decision-making of the American voter.
In Chapter Five I revisit the security issue, for a final rebuttal of the critics of Internet voting. And in the book’s Conclusion, entitled “What is to be done,” I suggest how Internet voting can be implemented, and I outline other uses for Internet voting in American politics. Here is the last paragraph,
"The potential for electronically democratizing American politics and government is only limited by what the American people want for themselves. If they want a government that does it all for them, so they can stay out of politics and watch TV, surf the Net, play with e-toys, or whatever, then that is what they will have. However, our Founding Generation’s spirit of Liberty through self-government once drove them to fight, sacrifice, and sometimes die in the American Revolution. If that spirit is still alive in our generation, then that spirit will find its way to realization through an electronic democracy based on Internet voting."
While a work of advocacy, the tone is friendly and has a scholarly restraint. The book is intended for the educated reader who is interested in thinking about the possibilities the Internet raises for change in American politics and history. It will appeal especially to those who would like to see some fresh thinking about how to reform our money-corrupted presidential election process.
My Ph.D. is in political science, from the University of California, Santa Barbara, 1985. Over the past 20 years I have taught American politics at UCSB, and in the Los Angeles junior college system. I have also taught citizenship to adult immigrants during that time.
I have two books on Amazon.com. One, entitled The New Election Game, was published in 1987. It reviewed the history of presidential campaign finance reform, and, inspired by Buckminster Fuller, proposed a system of telephone voting after watching debates on TV. Little did I know that the PC Revolution would soon make that idea obsolete. The second book, Progressive Logic (2005), is a study of the underlying principles of value shared by Progressives throughout American history.
I have been actively promoting my ideas for Internet voting online for over three years. Some of my essays can be found on the website Internet Evolution, at http://www.webcitation.org/5ZbugIFU0 and on the website Op Ed News at http://www.opednews.com/author/author36599.html where I have eight articles listed.
Even though this mss is not yet a book, interest in the idea is strong. I have been interviewed online, on the radio, and on TV.
Online: http://www.webcitation.org/5v0Z2RKPk
Jumping in Pools: Interview with Dr. William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
The first question is, “How would Internet voting have changed the 2008 election?”
For a radio interview by Jim Fetzer, go to
http://radiofetzer.blogspot.com/ and scroll down to February 10, 2010
Blip TV twice:
http://blip.tv/file/3750735 and http://www.blip.tv/file/3886970/
Public Speaking includes:
Center for Inquiry, September 19, 2010, Hollywood, AM; Costa Mesa, PM
http://www.webcitation.org/5v0OgtKiK
If you would like to see some, or all, of the chapters, I can send them to you as email attachments, or hard copies by mail, at your request.
Sincerely,
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Political Scientist, author, speaker,
CEO for The Internet Voting Research and Education Fund, a CA Nonprofit Foundation
Email: Internetvoting@gmail.com
Blog: http://internetvotingforall.blogspot.com/
Book on Internet Voting in progress: All chapter drafts can be read/downloaded (for free) at
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589
Face Book: http://tinyurl.com/BillonFB
Twitter: wjkno1
INTERNET VOTING NOW! HERE'S WHY. HERE'S HOW.
Dear {Specific Name}
SECURITY! Of course, this is what most folks worry about first when the subject of Internet voting comes up. The convenience offered by Internet voting in all US elections is easy to see – voting from home, work, etc., with no more treks to the polling place, where parking may be difficult to find and one may have to wait in line, perhaps in inclement weather. But because the fear factor looms large in many minds, security must be the first topic addressed in a book that advocates taking such a revolutionary leap forward. Chapter One thoroughly discusses the security issue, as well as the short history of Internet voting in the United States. (There were three small initial trials in the presidential election of 2000, and, among other things, a large project in 2004.)
I also show in the first chapter that Internet voting security technology is as sophisticated and reliable as the security technology used daily by the US military, international e-commerce and finance, as well as online banking and shopping.
My book’s main point is that Internet voting can be used to make US presidential elections both far more convenient and democratic than they are currently. I beef up the argument in favor of such a radical reform with a discussion of “The Original Intentions of Our Founding Fathers for Presidential Elections,” which is the title of Chapter Two. Drawing from sources that include The Federalist Papers, Madison’s Notes on the Philadelphia Convention, Washington’s Farewell Address, and quotes from the US Constitution, I show that the authors of the Constitution originally hoped that its procedure for presidential elections would deter political parties from coming to dominate the process. Well, that didn’t work, and I offer some reasons why. I also show that they intended their procedure, centered on the Electoral College, to be as orderly and conducive to reason and deliberation as was their convention in Philadelphia.
To invite criticisms from colleagues, I posted Chapter Two as an essay on SSRN, a website used by professors of law, political science, and other social sciences. So far, the paper has had over 2700 online reads, and almost 250 downloads. People have learned about it by word of mouth. I have received numerous comments via email, many of which have praised the work and offered helpful critiques. While I have posted all the chapter drafts there as essays, the polished products are available on request. (The drafts are at http://ssrn.com/author=1053589 Click on the chapter title to go to the page where the statistics are displayed. The essays on Polanyi listed there are not part of the book).
In Chapter Three I contrast our country’s current presidential election practices with the original intentions of the Constitution’s Framers as discussed in Chapter Two. It’s a poor match, indeed. Among other things, they anticipated a cost free process, and we have a money-dependent process because the costs of campaigning are so high. For example, candidate Obama raised and spent over $740,000,000 in his 2008 campaign. They hoped for a nonpartisan process, and ours is thoroughly partisan. But this need not be.
Chapter Four shows how Internet voting, rightly organized, can fully satisfy the hopes of the Framers for a deliberative process that would cost the candidates nothing. Let Citizens United be the rule, when organized along the lines I set forth, big spending will have little or no effect on the decision-making of the American voter.
In Chapter Five I revisit the security issue, for a final rebuttal of the critics of Internet voting. And in the book’s Conclusion, entitled “What is to be done,” I suggest how Internet voting can be implemented, and I outline other uses for Internet voting in American politics. Here is the last paragraph,
"The potential for electronically democratizing American politics and government is only limited by what the American people want for themselves. If they want a government that does it all for them, so they can stay out of politics and watch TV, surf the Net, play with e-toys, or whatever, then that is what they will have. However, our Founding Generation’s spirit of Liberty through self-government once drove them to fight, sacrifice, and sometimes die in the American Revolution. If that spirit is still alive in our generation, then that spirit will find its way to realization through an electronic democracy based on Internet voting."
While a work of advocacy, the tone is friendly and has a scholarly restraint. The book is intended for the educated reader who is interested in thinking about the possibilities the Internet raises for change in American politics and history. It will appeal especially to those who would like to see some fresh thinking about how to reform our money-corrupted presidential election process.
My Ph.D. is in political science, from the University of California, Santa Barbara, 1985. Over the past 20 years I have taught American politics at UCSB, and in the Los Angeles junior college system. I have also taught citizenship to adult immigrants during that time.
I have two books on Amazon.com. One, entitled The New Election Game, was published in 1987. It reviewed the history of presidential campaign finance reform, and, inspired by Buckminster Fuller, proposed a system of telephone voting after watching debates on TV. Little did I know that the PC Revolution would soon make that idea obsolete. The second book, Progressive Logic (2005), is a study of the underlying principles of value shared by Progressives throughout American history.
I have been actively promoting my ideas for Internet voting online for over three years. Some of my essays can be found on the website Internet Evolution, at http://www.webcitation.org/5ZbugIFU0 and on the website Op Ed News at http://www.opednews.com/author/author36599.html where I have eight articles listed.
Even though this mss is not yet a book, interest in the idea is strong. I have been interviewed online, on the radio, and on TV.
Online: http://www.webcitation.org/5v0Z2RKPk
Jumping in Pools: Interview with Dr. William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
The first question is, “How would Internet voting have changed the 2008 election?”
For a radio interview by Jim Fetzer, go to
http://radiofetzer.blogspot.com/ and scroll down to February 10, 2010
Blip TV twice:
http://blip.tv/file/3750735 and http://www.blip.tv/file/3886970/
Public Speaking includes:
Center for Inquiry, September 19, 2010, Hollywood, AM; Costa Mesa, PM
http://www.webcitation.org/5v0OgtKiK
If you would like to see some, or all, of the chapters, I can send them to you as email attachments, or hard copies by mail, at your request.
Sincerely,
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Political Scientist, author, speaker,
CEO for The Internet Voting Research and Education Fund, a CA Nonprofit Foundation
Email: Internetvoting@gmail.com
Blog: http://internetvotingforall.blogspot.com/
Book on Internet Voting in progress: All chapter drafts can be read/downloaded (for free) at
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589
Face Book: http://tinyurl.com/BillonFB
Twitter: wjkno1
Tuesday, December 7, 2010
Email of Support for Senator Sanders
Friends!
Email your Senators and Congressperson in support of Bernie Sanders!
Here is one sample letter:
Hon. Senator X/Congressperson Y:
I'm a constituent and I urge you to give all the support you possibly can to Senator Sanders as he opposes the deal President Obama recently made with the Repubs.
Millions for the Billionaires and a 13 month extension of unemployment checks is not acceptable for me. There must be a better way to extend the unemployment benefits. This is only the beginning of Obama’s “middle way wisdom.” Next they will demand 50% cuts in Social Security and Medicaid, and our President will “wisely” agree to 25%.
President Obama is missing the big picture. The social structure of the United States is changing. The gap between rich and poor is so vast now that no other industrial nation comes close. This is something NEW.
Costs of higher education are shutting out average families. Congress gave Billions to the superrich corporations to bail them out from their own stupid investments, and promised us that trickle-down would create jobs. Guess what? The more we gave the superrich, the higher unemployment went. Our infant mortality rate belongs in Africa, not here. What does this add up to?
Our nation is slipping into an Age of Neofeudalism. Democracy requires a strong middle class. As that erodes, our country will become one of peasants and Lords. This is the long term goal of the Repubs. If we don't fight this starting now, who will, and starting when?
Sincerely,
Email your Senators and Congressperson in support of Bernie Sanders!
Here is one sample letter:
Hon. Senator X/Congressperson Y:
I'm a constituent and I urge you to give all the support you possibly can to Senator Sanders as he opposes the deal President Obama recently made with the Repubs.
Millions for the Billionaires and a 13 month extension of unemployment checks is not acceptable for me. There must be a better way to extend the unemployment benefits. This is only the beginning of Obama’s “middle way wisdom.” Next they will demand 50% cuts in Social Security and Medicaid, and our President will “wisely” agree to 25%.
President Obama is missing the big picture. The social structure of the United States is changing. The gap between rich and poor is so vast now that no other industrial nation comes close. This is something NEW.
Costs of higher education are shutting out average families. Congress gave Billions to the superrich corporations to bail them out from their own stupid investments, and promised us that trickle-down would create jobs. Guess what? The more we gave the superrich, the higher unemployment went. Our infant mortality rate belongs in Africa, not here. What does this add up to?
Our nation is slipping into an Age of Neofeudalism. Democracy requires a strong middle class. As that erodes, our country will become one of peasants and Lords. This is the long term goal of the Repubs. If we don't fight this starting now, who will, and starting when?
Sincerely,
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
INTERNET VOTING COMING TO RUSSIA!
In elections to the Duma Russians will be able to vote via the Internet.
Chairman of the CEC of Russia Vladimir Churov proposes that in the State Duma elections in December 2011 an opportunity for voters to vote remotely by internet or by mobile phone. In his opinion, it will increase turnout and reduce the cost of elections.
"There should be a possibility of remote voting via the Internet or mobile communications - satellite, or conventional, it can seriously affect the increase in turnout," - he said Tuesday at a meeting of the Federation Council Committee on Regional Policy.
In addition, says Mr. Churov, such a move would seriously reduce the cost of expenditure on elections, because, for example, in the Murmansk region helicopter, which gives the voters the ballot box, costs about 65 thousand rubles per hour, and the Far East - More expensive.
"No reason to resist the remote vote no" - quoted by the CEC Chairman , RIA Novosti . According to him, remote voting in elections to the Duma may be introduced in remote regions, as well as the vote of Russians abroad.
http://tinyurl.com/IVinRuski
USA Wake Up!!
Chairman of the CEC of Russia Vladimir Churov proposes that in the State Duma elections in December 2011 an opportunity for voters to vote remotely by internet or by mobile phone. In his opinion, it will increase turnout and reduce the cost of elections.
"There should be a possibility of remote voting via the Internet or mobile communications - satellite, or conventional, it can seriously affect the increase in turnout," - he said Tuesday at a meeting of the Federation Council Committee on Regional Policy.
In addition, says Mr. Churov, such a move would seriously reduce the cost of expenditure on elections, because, for example, in the Murmansk region helicopter, which gives the voters the ballot box, costs about 65 thousand rubles per hour, and the Far East - More expensive.
"No reason to resist the remote vote no" - quoted by the CEC Chairman , RIA Novosti . According to him, remote voting in elections to the Duma may be introduced in remote regions, as well as the vote of Russians abroad.
http://tinyurl.com/IVinRuski
USA Wake Up!!
Saturday, November 6, 2010
Was the DC Hack a Conspiracy?
RE: Washington Post article on DC hack, at http://ow.ly/31Wgp
One true statements in this article is, “For more than a decade, computer security scientists have been warning of certain core dangers related to Internet voting." Yes, "warning," but never offering any evidence!
Simons and Jefferson, especially, are experts in what I call the Halloween method of opposing Internet voting; that is, telling really scary stories about what COULD happen if a system was hacked.(1) After a decade of crying "wolf!" without any actual facts to point to, the alarmists needed something concrete. The DC fiasco seems to be just what the doctor ordered. Now they use the DC hack as if it were proof that ALL Internet voting systems are as easy to hack. How convenient! Never mind the fact that in Europe, Canada, and the US Internet voting trials have all worked well – right now West Virginia and Arizona are having great success with well-built Internet voting systems.
Besides those pesky facts, all the facts have yet to be discovered about the DC incident. The article neglects to mention that the team at Trust the Vote, who built the DC system, have been long-time critics of Internet voting. That raises some yet unanswered questions.
Why did they submit a bid to build an Internet voting system? Why did the DC officials hire them, as opposed to the companies that built the currently successful West Virginia and Arizona systems?
One observer wrote on Slashdot (not me) that the system seems designed to fail.(2) Could that be true? Was the very construction of the system an insider attack? Did the builders plant a back door? What kind of communication did Trust the Vote members have with Halderman, after they got the DC contract? Just how duped and used were the DC officials?
1. For more details on this history see "Scary Stories Fail to Stop Internet Voting"
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589
2. More details and citations at, http://bit.ly/bk0cpQ
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Email: InternetVoting@gmail.com
Blog: http://internetvotingforall.blogspot.com/
Twitter: wjkno1
FB: William Kelleher
Posted as a comment to the WashP article by: wjkellpro | October 30, 2010 3:50 PM
One true statements in this article is, “For more than a decade, computer security scientists have been warning of certain core dangers related to Internet voting." Yes, "warning," but never offering any evidence!
Simons and Jefferson, especially, are experts in what I call the Halloween method of opposing Internet voting; that is, telling really scary stories about what COULD happen if a system was hacked.(1) After a decade of crying "wolf!" without any actual facts to point to, the alarmists needed something concrete. The DC fiasco seems to be just what the doctor ordered. Now they use the DC hack as if it were proof that ALL Internet voting systems are as easy to hack. How convenient! Never mind the fact that in Europe, Canada, and the US Internet voting trials have all worked well – right now West Virginia and Arizona are having great success with well-built Internet voting systems.
Besides those pesky facts, all the facts have yet to be discovered about the DC incident. The article neglects to mention that the team at Trust the Vote, who built the DC system, have been long-time critics of Internet voting. That raises some yet unanswered questions.
Why did they submit a bid to build an Internet voting system? Why did the DC officials hire them, as opposed to the companies that built the currently successful West Virginia and Arizona systems?
One observer wrote on Slashdot (not me) that the system seems designed to fail.(2) Could that be true? Was the very construction of the system an insider attack? Did the builders plant a back door? What kind of communication did Trust the Vote members have with Halderman, after they got the DC contract? Just how duped and used were the DC officials?
1. For more details on this history see "Scary Stories Fail to Stop Internet Voting"
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589
2. More details and citations at, http://bit.ly/bk0cpQ
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Email: InternetVoting@gmail.com
Blog: http://internetvotingforall.blogspot.com/
Twitter: wjkno1
FB: William Kelleher
Posted as a comment to the WashP article by: wjkellpro | October 30, 2010 3:50 PM
Saturday, October 30, 2010
Breaking News!
The Washington Post has just published an article by anti-Internet voting extremists Epstein, Simons, and Jefferson. They make the ridiculous claim that the DC hackers did the nation a service. But, the paper also printed my critique, and my suggestion that the hack may have been a conspiracy. Go to http://ow.ly/31Wgo
(Copy and paste)
Hearing both sides, folks can decide -- DC hackers: good guys or conspirators?
(Copy and paste)
Hearing both sides, folks can decide -- DC hackers: good guys or conspirators?
Friday, October 29, 2010
CSOonline.com Dodges Debate on Internet Voting Security!
I tried to balance out this anti-Internet voting propaganda with facts and commonsense, but CSOonline.com would have none of that. Apparently, they only want to see one side. I wouldn’t have bothered to disillusion them, but for two reasons I had to persist. One is that the author is a worshipper of St. David Jefferson, and the other is that John Sebes has joined the love fest (he’s an insider on the DC fiasco).
Why won’t any of these True Believers engage me in an intelligent debate? (Do they all share a lack of courage? Sebes has even deleted my efforts to engage him on his blog; right, John?)
So, here is the propaganda piece, and my forbidden reply:
E-voting: How secure is it?
More than half of all states in the U.S. will allow some kind of internet voting this year. But security experts say it's a mistake and puts the nation at risk.
By Joan Goodchild, Senior Editor, October 28, 2010 — CSO —
Election fraud and vote tampering is as old as government. Before the American Revolution, most voting was done by voice. Voters would call out their pick for all to hear, which lead to intimidation and other nefarious tactics by those hoping to impact election results. The creation of the secret ballot was an improvement, but brought with it another host of possible modes of manipulation. In a quote that is now famous in American history, corrupt politician and Tammany Hall leader Boss Tweed often told constituents to 'vote early, and often.'
But surely, by 2010, with technology as sophisticated as it is and elections as regulated as they are, any voting system rolled out these days is no doubt fool-proof and iron-clad in terms of security, right? Not so, say some voting security experts. And, in fact, it's technology that makes new voting systems dangerous.
Back in 1999, David Jefferson, a computer scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and chairman of Verified Voting, an organization that monitors security of election systems, first began examining the issue of electronic voting, specifically internet voting, as technical chairman of a task force set up by the Secretary of State in California. "The original idea was that internet voting was a fine idea, and the only question was how best to deliver this capability to the citizens of California," recalled Jefferson. "The vision was people would be able to vote from home with computers, in their pajamas, or they could vote on the road, from the hotel, or from an Internet café. At any time, from anywhere. But as we studied the issue more carefully, we realized that it was a hopelessly dangerous concept."
The result, said Jefferson, was a report authored by the group advising election officials not to proceed with internet voting, at least not for a very long time. And in the 10-plus years since the report was released, Jefferson says the concept of internet voting has become no more secure.
Yet many states, in an effort to allow military and other overseas citizenry to vote, have opted to adopt it, much to Jefferson's amazement.
According to the Verified Voting, more than 30 states will allow ballots to be cast by email, fax or online this year. "This is a national security issue," said Jefferson, who vehemently opposes internet voting as much today as he did in 1999. "In elections, we are electing the President and the members of Congress who are going to make law and run the government of the United States. But we can expose the election infrastructure to cyber attacks by anybody in the world. That's what we do when we conduct online elections."
Case in point, according to Jefferson, is the recent demonstration by a team of students led by University of Michigan professor Alex Halderman. The group managed to easily hack into an internet-based system for overseas and military voters that the District of Columbia planned to test in the November election. Along the way, the team also found evidence the system had been penetrated by both Iranian and Chinese hackers.
"One of the great fears in an internet election is that you are exposing our votes to manipulation by foreign powers," said Jefferson. "I just consider this to be a major national security risk; a totally unnecessary, needless risk and it's shocking to me that election officials turn away from this. They don't want to hear it, and they certainly don't want to do anything about it." [THEY don’t want to hear it! Ed]
"As we moved to mechanical voting machines a century ago we moved into the era of Dilbert's boss administering technology he didn't understand," said Douglas Jones, an associate professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Iowa and a scientific expert serving on the federal Election Assistance Commission's Technical Guidelines Development Committee. "We're still there. We've advanced the technology and Dilbert's boss knows more now than he did a century ago. But he still doesn't know enough to master the system he's running."
Jones says elections officials in D.C. deserve a lot of credit for allowing the pilot system to be opened up to public test before actually using it in an election, even if it was done late and exposed serious problems. But he fears these kinds of precautions aren't being taken in smaller municipalities around the country with limited funds.
"The people in the D.C. election office who were administering the servers were people who have a lot of experience administering servers in the closed world of classical elections with no internet connections and no outsiders to deal with," said Jones. "This is evidence that the election office wasn't anywhere near up to administering a machine that was connected to the public internet. And the Washington D.C. people actually have a staff of professionally-trained people who know what they're doing. You can't say that in your typical county. The large, urban counties have resources in their election offices that average county doesn't have."
On-site electronic voting machines also risky
Both security experts also point to electronic voting machines as security risks, too. Electronic machines that allow votes to be cast at precincts without paper became popular after the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, and the now famous "hanging chad" controversy. But even these machines, used in a closed-precinct environment, still make Jefferson uncomfortable because of the possibility of vote tampering.
"The paperless, electronic-voting machines, machines in which there is no paper trail, and no way of auditing those machines, are a major security risk. But there are many election officials, even entire states, that insist they can conduct elections strictly with electronic-voting machines and that there are no security risks with it."
The lack of auditing inherent in many types of these kinds of machines causes controversy regularly. In fact, a conservative watchdog group in Nevada is currently embroiled in an argument with voting machine technicians in one county that are represented by the union SEIU. The group, Americans for Limited Government, wants state officials to intervene and ensure SEIU workers who operate the machines don't skew the results in favor of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, the union-endorsed candidate. Issues like this crop up every election season, noted Jefferson. Still, it's internet voting, and it's possible widespread adoption, that keeps him up at night.
"Internet voting is really this year's voting problem and I have to say it's about a thousand-times worse than the security risk of straight electronic voting machines in precincts," he said. [end]
http://www.csoonline.com/article/630699/e-voting-how-secure-is-it-
KELLEHER’S FORBIDDEN COMMENT
This article is a tad one-sided. The message it conveys is that “some voting security experts,” like David Jefferson and Douglas Jones, have sure-fire knowledge about the insecurity of Internet voting, while all the government officials who are trying it are clueless. Of course, it is not only the local election officials who do not understand, it is all those who have advised them along the way. That includes the experts who set up the systems now being successfully used by West Virginia and Arizona.
Six years ago, the Department of Defense had an Internet voting system ready to be used by a group of 100,000 overseas volunteers. Jefferson was one of the four rouge computer scientists who, with the help of the New York Times, publicized a pack of really scary stories about what a “catastrophe” would occur with Internet voting. One example is, “you are exposing our votes to manipulation by foreign powers,” an old refrain used again in Ms Goodchild’s article. Frightened out of his wits, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, who was also angling for the presidency of the World Bank, ordered a halt to the program. (He got the job.)
That was in 2004. Since then Internet voting has been tried with repeated success in some provinces in Canada, and in several nations in Europe. Hall and Alvarez write that no security, or other, problems have been reported. (Electronic Elections, page 71.) The voting security experts who built these systems must also be deluded, if Jones and Jefferson are to be believed.
But the repeated success of Internet voting trials around the world seems to belie the cries of “wolf!” that alarmists like Jefferson have made a career on. Their scary stories appear to have no basis in experience, with the sole exception of the recent DC fiasco. (For more details on this see “Scary Stories Fail to Stop Internet Voting”
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589 )
Also, Bob Carey, head of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, announced at a recent meeting that the Department of Defense has decided to restore the old SERVE system, with all the updates now available. (Citation given in “Scary Stories”)
Ms Goodchild’s article refers to the DC hack as if it were evidence in favor of the case made by Jefferson et al. But all the facts have yet to be discovered. For instance, the team at Trust the Vote, who built the DC system, have been, like Jefferson, long-time critics of Internet voting. Why did they submit a bid to build the system? Why did the DC officials hire them, as opposed to the companies that built the West Virginia and Arizona systems?
One observer wrote on Slashdot, not me, that the system seems designed to fail. Could that be true? Was the very construction of the system an insider attack? After a decade of crying “wolf!” without any actual facts to point to, the anti-Internet voting activists needed something tangible. The DC fiasco seems to be just what the doctor ordered.
Since John Sebes has joined the discussion, perhaps he can address some of these questions. (For more on this, including citations, see “Does the DC Fiasco Damn Internet Voting?” http://bit.ly/aIfiRa )
The Internet voting security debate has been one-sided for far too long, with the alarmist squeaky wheel getting all the attention. CIO.com would be an excellent spot for an intellectually honest engagement of the issues.
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Fri, 2010-10-29 18:48
"Your comment has been queued for moderation by site administrators and will be published after approval."
Why won’t any of these True Believers engage me in an intelligent debate? (Do they all share a lack of courage? Sebes has even deleted my efforts to engage him on his blog; right, John?)
So, here is the propaganda piece, and my forbidden reply:
E-voting: How secure is it?
More than half of all states in the U.S. will allow some kind of internet voting this year. But security experts say it's a mistake and puts the nation at risk.
By Joan Goodchild, Senior Editor, October 28, 2010 — CSO —
Election fraud and vote tampering is as old as government. Before the American Revolution, most voting was done by voice. Voters would call out their pick for all to hear, which lead to intimidation and other nefarious tactics by those hoping to impact election results. The creation of the secret ballot was an improvement, but brought with it another host of possible modes of manipulation. In a quote that is now famous in American history, corrupt politician and Tammany Hall leader Boss Tweed often told constituents to 'vote early, and often.'
But surely, by 2010, with technology as sophisticated as it is and elections as regulated as they are, any voting system rolled out these days is no doubt fool-proof and iron-clad in terms of security, right? Not so, say some voting security experts. And, in fact, it's technology that makes new voting systems dangerous.
Back in 1999, David Jefferson, a computer scientist at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and chairman of Verified Voting, an organization that monitors security of election systems, first began examining the issue of electronic voting, specifically internet voting, as technical chairman of a task force set up by the Secretary of State in California. "The original idea was that internet voting was a fine idea, and the only question was how best to deliver this capability to the citizens of California," recalled Jefferson. "The vision was people would be able to vote from home with computers, in their pajamas, or they could vote on the road, from the hotel, or from an Internet café. At any time, from anywhere. But as we studied the issue more carefully, we realized that it was a hopelessly dangerous concept."
The result, said Jefferson, was a report authored by the group advising election officials not to proceed with internet voting, at least not for a very long time. And in the 10-plus years since the report was released, Jefferson says the concept of internet voting has become no more secure.
Yet many states, in an effort to allow military and other overseas citizenry to vote, have opted to adopt it, much to Jefferson's amazement.
According to the Verified Voting, more than 30 states will allow ballots to be cast by email, fax or online this year. "This is a national security issue," said Jefferson, who vehemently opposes internet voting as much today as he did in 1999. "In elections, we are electing the President and the members of Congress who are going to make law and run the government of the United States. But we can expose the election infrastructure to cyber attacks by anybody in the world. That's what we do when we conduct online elections."
Case in point, according to Jefferson, is the recent demonstration by a team of students led by University of Michigan professor Alex Halderman. The group managed to easily hack into an internet-based system for overseas and military voters that the District of Columbia planned to test in the November election. Along the way, the team also found evidence the system had been penetrated by both Iranian and Chinese hackers.
"One of the great fears in an internet election is that you are exposing our votes to manipulation by foreign powers," said Jefferson. "I just consider this to be a major national security risk; a totally unnecessary, needless risk and it's shocking to me that election officials turn away from this. They don't want to hear it, and they certainly don't want to do anything about it." [THEY don’t want to hear it! Ed]
"As we moved to mechanical voting machines a century ago we moved into the era of Dilbert's boss administering technology he didn't understand," said Douglas Jones, an associate professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Iowa and a scientific expert serving on the federal Election Assistance Commission's Technical Guidelines Development Committee. "We're still there. We've advanced the technology and Dilbert's boss knows more now than he did a century ago. But he still doesn't know enough to master the system he's running."
Jones says elections officials in D.C. deserve a lot of credit for allowing the pilot system to be opened up to public test before actually using it in an election, even if it was done late and exposed serious problems. But he fears these kinds of precautions aren't being taken in smaller municipalities around the country with limited funds.
"The people in the D.C. election office who were administering the servers were people who have a lot of experience administering servers in the closed world of classical elections with no internet connections and no outsiders to deal with," said Jones. "This is evidence that the election office wasn't anywhere near up to administering a machine that was connected to the public internet. And the Washington D.C. people actually have a staff of professionally-trained people who know what they're doing. You can't say that in your typical county. The large, urban counties have resources in their election offices that average county doesn't have."
On-site electronic voting machines also risky
Both security experts also point to electronic voting machines as security risks, too. Electronic machines that allow votes to be cast at precincts without paper became popular after the 2000 U.S. Presidential election, and the now famous "hanging chad" controversy. But even these machines, used in a closed-precinct environment, still make Jefferson uncomfortable because of the possibility of vote tampering.
"The paperless, electronic-voting machines, machines in which there is no paper trail, and no way of auditing those machines, are a major security risk. But there are many election officials, even entire states, that insist they can conduct elections strictly with electronic-voting machines and that there are no security risks with it."
The lack of auditing inherent in many types of these kinds of machines causes controversy regularly. In fact, a conservative watchdog group in Nevada is currently embroiled in an argument with voting machine technicians in one county that are represented by the union SEIU. The group, Americans for Limited Government, wants state officials to intervene and ensure SEIU workers who operate the machines don't skew the results in favor of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, the union-endorsed candidate. Issues like this crop up every election season, noted Jefferson. Still, it's internet voting, and it's possible widespread adoption, that keeps him up at night.
"Internet voting is really this year's voting problem and I have to say it's about a thousand-times worse than the security risk of straight electronic voting machines in precincts," he said. [end]
http://www.csoonline.com/article/630699/e-voting-how-secure-is-it-
KELLEHER’S FORBIDDEN COMMENT
This article is a tad one-sided. The message it conveys is that “some voting security experts,” like David Jefferson and Douglas Jones, have sure-fire knowledge about the insecurity of Internet voting, while all the government officials who are trying it are clueless. Of course, it is not only the local election officials who do not understand, it is all those who have advised them along the way. That includes the experts who set up the systems now being successfully used by West Virginia and Arizona.
Six years ago, the Department of Defense had an Internet voting system ready to be used by a group of 100,000 overseas volunteers. Jefferson was one of the four rouge computer scientists who, with the help of the New York Times, publicized a pack of really scary stories about what a “catastrophe” would occur with Internet voting. One example is, “you are exposing our votes to manipulation by foreign powers,” an old refrain used again in Ms Goodchild’s article. Frightened out of his wits, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, who was also angling for the presidency of the World Bank, ordered a halt to the program. (He got the job.)
That was in 2004. Since then Internet voting has been tried with repeated success in some provinces in Canada, and in several nations in Europe. Hall and Alvarez write that no security, or other, problems have been reported. (Electronic Elections, page 71.) The voting security experts who built these systems must also be deluded, if Jones and Jefferson are to be believed.
But the repeated success of Internet voting trials around the world seems to belie the cries of “wolf!” that alarmists like Jefferson have made a career on. Their scary stories appear to have no basis in experience, with the sole exception of the recent DC fiasco. (For more details on this see “Scary Stories Fail to Stop Internet Voting”
http://ssrn.com/author=1053589 )
Also, Bob Carey, head of the Federal Voting Assistance Program, announced at a recent meeting that the Department of Defense has decided to restore the old SERVE system, with all the updates now available. (Citation given in “Scary Stories”)
Ms Goodchild’s article refers to the DC hack as if it were evidence in favor of the case made by Jefferson et al. But all the facts have yet to be discovered. For instance, the team at Trust the Vote, who built the DC system, have been, like Jefferson, long-time critics of Internet voting. Why did they submit a bid to build the system? Why did the DC officials hire them, as opposed to the companies that built the West Virginia and Arizona systems?
One observer wrote on Slashdot, not me, that the system seems designed to fail. Could that be true? Was the very construction of the system an insider attack? After a decade of crying “wolf!” without any actual facts to point to, the anti-Internet voting activists needed something tangible. The DC fiasco seems to be just what the doctor ordered.
Since John Sebes has joined the discussion, perhaps he can address some of these questions. (For more on this, including citations, see “Does the DC Fiasco Damn Internet Voting?” http://bit.ly/aIfiRa )
The Internet voting security debate has been one-sided for far too long, with the alarmist squeaky wheel getting all the attention. CIO.com would be an excellent spot for an intellectually honest engagement of the issues.
William J. Kelleher, Ph.D.
Fri, 2010-10-29 18:48
"Your comment has been queued for moderation by site administrators and will be published after approval."
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)